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MISSOURI HEALTH CARE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 1 the United
States Supreme Court held that Missouri may require clear and convinc-
ing evidence of a patient's desire to withdraw nutrition and hydration
when that patient is in a persistent vegetative state.2 In response to this
decision,3 the Missouri legislature passed Senate bill 148, The Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care Act,4 to enable Missouri citizens to
designate others to make health care decisions on their behalf if they
should subsequently become incapacitated.5 By authorizing advance
planning for health care, Senate bill 148 seemingly alleviates the need for
legally appointed health care proxies6 to prove to the courts that with-
drawal is consistent with the patient's intent.7 Enacted on August 28,
1991, Senate bill 148 represents an important step in the development of
laws protecting the rights of individuals to execute advance directives.8
1. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
2. 110 S. Ct. at 2854. Nancy Cruzan was severely injured in an automobile accident. As a
result of brain injuries sustained in the accident, Cruzan existed for several years in a persistent
vegetative state. Id. at 2845. During this time, the State of Missouri paid for her medical care. Id.
at 2846. Cruzan's parents requested that the state terminate her artificial nutrition and hydration.
Id. However, the State refused their request. Id.
3. See Signing of Health Care Proxy Bill Caps Long Struggle, Mo. B. BULL., June 1991, at 4
[hereinafter Signing of Health Care Proxy Bill].
4. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 404.800-.865 (Supp. 1991). The Missouri Bar's Probate and Trust Law
Committee began drafting health care proxy legislation in 1987. Signing of Health Care Proxy Bill,
supra note 3, at 4. The subcommittee submitted drafts of the Health Care Surrogate Act which the
Missouri General Assembly rejected in 1988, 1989, and again in 1990. Id. After Cruzan, the sub-
committee not only reintroduced the Health Care Surrogate Act, but it also proposed to amend
Missouri's general durable power of attorney statute. This proposal, Senate Bill 148, provided ex-
press authority for health care decision-making. Governor John Ashcroft signed Senate Bill 148 on
May 17, 1991. Id.
5. In Cruzan, Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, suggested that states have a duty to honor
the decisions of health care surrogates appointed under health care durable powers of attorney.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857. See also Ilene V. Goldberg, S. Ct. Case Shows When Living Wills Can
Be Used to Carry Out a Client's Wishes, EsT. PLAN., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 328, 331.
6. A health care proxy is the individual or corporation appointed by the patient to act as her
agent in making health care decisions. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.703(1) (Supp. 1991).
7. By authorizing the appointment of surrogate health care decision-makers, Senate Bill 148
enables patients to convey their intentions to withdraw or withhold nutrition and hydration under
specified circumstances. A health care proxy legally appointed under the Durable Power of Attor-
ney for Health Care Act is authorized and obligated to ensure that the patient's nutrition and hydra-
tion are withdrawn. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.820 (Supp. 1991). A health care proxy does not need to
request the court's permission before withdrawing her nutrition and hydration.
8. Advance directives are written instructions, such as state recognized living wills or durable
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In addition, the bill places new and significant responsibilities on health
care providers.9
I. BACKGROUND
The issue of an individual's right to control prospective health care
decisions first arose in the late 1970s with the highly publicized debates
over the plight of a comatose car accident victim, Karen Quinlan.' 0 In
In re Quinlan," the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that it could
require the hospital to remove life-support equipment. 2 Following In re
Quinlan, in 1976, California became the first state to enact a living will
statute, 3 which authorized terminally ill patients to execute advance di-
rectives informing health care providers of the patient's views regarding
life support.' 4 Forty-two states followed California and passed legisla-
tion authorizing such living wills.'s
powers of attorney for health care, which relate to the provision of care when an individual is inca-
pacitated. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w)(4) (1991). See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
10. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653-54 cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Karen Quinlan
became irreversibly comatose after suffering severe brain damage in a car accident. Prior to her
sudden catastrophic injury, Quinlan indicated to several friends that she disapproved of extraordi-
nary life-sustaining medical procedures. Id. at 653. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined
that Quinlan's statements were of little probative value. Id. Nevertheless, the court authorized
Quinlan's health care providers to discontinue her life-support if her attending physicians deter-
mined that she would not recover and both her guardian and family consented. Id. at 671.
11. 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
12. Id. at 671.
13. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West 1970 & Supp. 1992).
14. George Alexander, Time for a New Law on Health Care Advance Directives, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 755, 758 (1991).
15. Alexander, supra note 14, at 758. See also ALA. CODE § 22-8A-1 (1981); ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.12.010 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-201
(Michie 1987); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-101 (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570 (West
1990); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2501 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421 (1989); FLA. STAT, ANN.
§ 765.01 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-4101 (Harrison 1986); HAW. REv. STAT. § 327D
(Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4501 (Supp. 1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, par. 701 (1988);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-1 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1-144A.11 (West 1989);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,101 (1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299:58.1 (West Supp. 1990);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2921 (West Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-601
(1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-145B.17 (West Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-101
(Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-101
(1989); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 449.540 (Michie Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:1
(Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-1 (Michie 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 (1989); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp.
1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.605 (Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-10 (Law Co-op. Supp.
1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12C-1 (Supp. 1990); TEN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-101 (Supp.
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Some states improved their living will legislation by enacting health
care durable power of attorney statutes,1 6 which authorize the appoint-
ment of health care proxies. 7 Under most durable power of attorney for
health care provisions, appointed proxies are entitled to receive all rele-
vant health care information from health care providers.I Additionally,
appointed proxies are empowered to make any health care decisions af-
fecting an incapacitated patient.1 9
An individual's right to make prospective health care decisions is fur-
ther protected at the federal level by the Patient Health Care Self Deter-
1990); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.001 (West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-
2-1101 (Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5251 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1.2981 (Michie
Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010 (West Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-1
(1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01 (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-101 (1988).
For a comparison of living will statutes, see Christopher J. Condie, Comparison of the Living Will
Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 105 (1988).
16. Alexander, supra note 14, at 759. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-20 (Michie 1989);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2052 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2201 (1989); 1990 Fla. Laws 223;
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-1 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch.
110 1/2, para. 802-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 16.8-12-5 (Bums 1990); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 144A.7(1)(a) (West 1989); 1989 Kan. Sess. Laws 181; 1990 Ky. ACTS 123; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (West
Supp. 1990); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-601 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145(B).01
(West Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-151 (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.810
(Michie Supp. 1989); 1990 N.Y. Laws 752; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.12 (Baldwin Supp. 1989);
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.510 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-1 (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 59-7-2.5 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-202 (Supp. 1990); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590h-1 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1105-1106 (Supp. 1989); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3453 (1989); VA. CODE ANN § 54.1-2986(2) (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 11.94.046 (West Supp. 1990); W.VA. CODE § 16-30A-3 (Supp. 1990); 1989 Wis. Laws 200; Wyo.
STAT. § 35-22-102 (1988).
17. A court is not required to participate in the appointment. Rather, a court considers a
health care proxy appointed once the durable power of attorney documents are properly executed.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.705(3) (Supp. 1991).
18. See, eg., Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.822 (Supp. 1991).
19. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.825 (Supp. 1991). A few states enacted legislation to
further protect an individual's right to execute advance directives. See Alexander, supra note 14, at
759-60. These states passed laws that specifically authorize a court to appoint a patient's family
members as health care proxies in the absence of her written advance directives. Similar to proxies
selected by individuals who execute durable powers of attorney for health care, court appointed
proxies have the power to make health care decisions for incapacitated family members. Id. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.304 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990).
One commentator has criticized the provisions adopted in Florida which enable family members
to act as health care surrogates for incapacitated patients. Robert C. Waters, Florida Durable Power
of Attorney Law: The Need For Reform, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 519, 533 (1990) (arguing that the
provisions limiting surrogacy to specific family members prevent immediate action on behalf of inca-
pacitated patients because the court must search for family members). Nevertheless, family consent
laws offer additional protection to incapacitated patients with particular health care concerns.
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mination Act ("Self Determination Act").20 The Self Determination Act
requires health care providers21 to maintain written policies and proce-
dures to: (1) furnish written information to each individual concerning
both the individual's rights, under state law, to make medical treatment
decisions and the provider's policies concerning implementation of such
rights;22 (2) document in the patient's medical record whether the patient
has executed an advance directive;23 (3) ensure compliance with state
laws respecting advance directives;24 and (4) educate staff and the com-
munity on advance directives.25 While the statutory protections con-
tained in the Self Determination Act are important, they do not protect
an individual's right to make prospective health care decisions. The Self
Determination Act only protects the right to make prospective health
care decisions when state courts or state legislatures previously created
such rights.26 Consequently, state laws authorizing advance directives
are critical to the protection of an individual's right to make treatment
decisions.
II. MISSOURI LAW
In Missouri, all competent citizens have a right to execute a living
will," but these advance directives do not govern all medical situations.
Under the statutory provisions, a living will does not become operative
unless the patient has an incurable or irreversible condition in which
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w) (Supp. 1991).
21. The Act includes hospitals, nursing facilities, hospice programs, home care providers, and
health maintenance organizations among the regulated care providers. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w) (Supp.
1991).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w)(1)(A) (Supp. 1991).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w)(1)(B) (Supp. 1991).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w)(1)(D) (Supp. 1991).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w)(1)(E) (Supp. 1991). Community education is arguably the most im-
portant mandate of the Self Determination Act because many disputes over withdrawal arise when a
patient has not executed an advance directive. See, eg., In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, slip op. (Mo.
Ct. App., E.D. Mar. 5, 1991) (denying the transfer of a patient in a persistent vegetative state to
another state to enable the withdrawal of life-sustaining care); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (denying parents' request to remove artificial nutrition and hydration
from their comatose daughter). Better information may encourage more patients to execute advance
directives and avoid the need for judicial intervention.
The Self Determination Act also requires that each state write a description of its laws on advance
directives to distribute to hospitals, nursing homes, and health maintenance organizations. For a
discussion of the effect of these requirements on practitioners, see John E. Bos, Living Wills, 70
MICH. B. J., 444, 444 (May 1991).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1991).
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.015 (1986).
[Vol. 70:973
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death will occur within a short time despite medical care.2' Thus, Mis-
souri's living will statute leaves incompetent Missouri citizens, who are
not terminally ill, without any means of controlling health care decisions.
Similarly, Missouri's general durable power of attorney29 and guardi-
anship statutes provide only limited protection of an individual's right to
make prospective health care decisions. The general durable power of
attorney statute expressly denies appointees the power to make any
health care decisions,"0 and the guardianship provisions prevent family
members of incapacitated adults from consenting to medical treatment
for the incapacitated individual.31 Thus, with the exception of guardian-
ship provisions authorizing parents and guardians to make health care
decisions for minors, 2 no statute granting family members or designated
proxies the right to make health care decisions for incompetent or inca-
pacitated persons existed in Missouri until the enactment of Senate bill
148. 33
III. THE RIGHT TO DECIDE
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that an individual
possesses the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, including the
right to refuse death-prolonging nutrition and hydration. 4 Historically,
28. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.025 (1986).
29. Missouri's general durable power of attorney statute authorizes the appointment of an at-
torney in fact to act in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of the principal. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.710(l)
(Supp. 1991).
30. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.710(6) (Supp. 1991).
31. Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.061 (1986).
32. In Missouri, a family member may not consent to medical treatment for a patient unless
that family member is a guardian of a minor child. Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.061 (1986).
33. In Steele v. Woods, the Missouri Supreme Court suggested that families have the right to
make medical treatment decisions for an incompetent family member. 327 S.W.2d 187, 198 (Mo.
1959). In Steele, the court noted, in dicta:
Depending upon the circumstances of the case, the seriousness of the need, and the urgency
of the situation, perhaps the time or interval of the patient's mental incapacity, the circum-
stances may require and make it [the physician's] duty to communicate with and advise the
husband or other members of the family who are available and competent to advise with or
speak for the patient or take other steps to bring understanding of the need home to the
[patient].
Id. (emphasis added).
Despite the inference in Steele, courts have refused to grant family members any common law
right to act as surrogate decision makers for incapacitated persons. See R. Edward Murphy, A New
Form of Medical Malpractice? Missouri's "Living Will"Statute, J. Mo. BAR., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 11,
12.
34. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1990).
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incompetent patients have had difficulty exercising this right.35 Legisla-
tures have responded to this difficulty by enacting two different types of
statutes: living will statutes and durable powers of attorney for health
care acts.36
A. Inadequacies of Living Wills
States initially enacted natural death acts or living will statutes to al-
low incompetent patients the right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment. While living wills enable patients to execute advance directives
providing for the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, most living will
statutes fail to adequately protect the patient's right to decide. First, liv-
ing wills are unable to address every potential medical decision. 37 Sec-
ond, living wills become effective only when a patient is terminally ill. 38
Third, living wills may lapse if not re-executed. 39 Finally, in practice,
physicians have refused to follow the directives in the living wills.40
B. The Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Alternative
Thirty-two states have enacted durable power of attorney for health
care statutes as a solution to the inadequacies of living wills.41 Advance
35. See, eg., id.; In re Busalachi, No. 59582, slip op. (Mo. Ct. App., E.D. Mar. 5, 1991).
36. See supra note 19. One commentator believes family consent laws offer an important alter-
native to durable powers of attorney for health care. Id. By allowing family members to make
medical decisions in the absence of a durable power of attorney document, family consent laws
promote implementation of a patient's health care decision. But cf. Waters, supra note 19, at 533.
37. Mark A. Fowler, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 985, 999 (1984).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1000.
40. Several problems arise from the vague terminology and the conflicting language contained
in Missouri's living will statute. First, the statute provides that only a person who is able to receive
and evaluate information and communicate a decision may execute a living will. Murphy, supra
note 33, at 15. The statute does not indicate what information should be evaluated, nor does it define
communication. Second, physicians are obligated to comply with the patient's declaration even
though they are not required to be present when the declaration is communicated. Id. Third, the
statute provides that a declaration may be signed at the declarant's direction. Id. Thus, a direction
may be verbal despite another requirement that the will be written. Fourth, the statute authorizes
revocation without regard to the patient's mental condition. Id. Also, the declaration does not
become effective until the declarant is unable to make treatment decisions. Id. at 15-16. Fifth, a
patient's condition is not deemed terminal until a physician determines that death will occur within a
"short amount of time." However, the statute fails to define whether this term means days or years.
Id. at 16. Finally, the statute allows withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures, but these proce-
dures do not include the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. Id. at 17.
41. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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planning through the appointment of proxy decision-makers allows both
flexibility and certainty which may be unachievable through a living
will. 2 Although some argue that agency is not the best solution to the
problem of treating incapacitated patients, many advantages to durable
powers of attorney for health care exist. 3
First, health care durable power of attorney provisions alleviate the
need to anticipate medical conditions and treatment choices.' Second, a
proxy ("attorney in fact")45 can enforce treatment preferences and en-
sure that physicians or family members do not disregard the patient's
intentions. 6 Finally, the attorney in fact will be faithful to the patient's
preferences; thus, the patient avoids potentially unreliable decision-mak-
ing by a physician or, alternatively, a court appointed guardian.47 While
certain risks remain,4" a health care durable power of attorney provides
certainty for physicians and courts, which is impossible to achieve
through simple living will and guardianship provisions.49
The drafters of durable power of attorney statutes should include a
number of provisions to adequately protect a patient's right to make
medical choices and to ensure that the treatment decisions are followed
by family members, physicians, and the courts. First, a legislature
should enact a durable power of attorney statute that is consistent with
the state's living will and guardianship provisions." Second, the health
care durable power of attorney law should authorize advance directives
addressing routine, as well as life-threatening situations and the with-
42. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
43. See generally Fowler, supra note 37.
44. Id. at 1001.
45. Attorney in fact is the legislative term for the party appointed by the patient to make health
care decisions under the durable power of attorney for health care if the patient is unable to decide
herself. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.703(1) (Supp. 1991).
46. See generally Fowler, supra note 37.
47. Id. at 1002.
48. Id. at 1005. The risks include the possibility that: (1) the surrogate decision-maker will
make an irrational decision; (2) the health care provider will hastily classify the patient as incapaci-
tated; (3) the patient will select an untrustworthy proxy; or (4) the patient may change her choice of
appointee over time. Id. at 1007-08. None of these risks warrants eliminating surrogacy as a means
of protecting a patient's right to make health care decisions in advance of incapacitation.
49. Id. at 1008. Without certainty, physicians will refuse to follow directives; third parties will
not agree to appointment; and finally, courts will be unable to protect patients who select advance
directives as a method of controlling health care decisions.
50. See Wendy A. Kronmiller, Comment, A Necessary Compromise: The Right to Forego Artifi-
cial Nutrition and Hydration Under Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 47 MD. L. REV.
1188, 1215 (1988). See also Fowler, supra note 37, at 1025.
1992]
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drawal of all procedures. 51 Third, drafters should include provisions for
educating the public and informing physicians of advance directives.52
Fourth, the statute should provide restrictions for persons who may be
appointed attorneys in fact.53 Fifth, the legislature should specify the
powers of health care proxies.54 Sixth, the statute should list the types of
decisions which an attorney in fact is not authorized to make.55 Seventh,
any durable power of attorney for health care law should address the
potential liability of a health care attorney in fact.56 Eighth, the law
should prevent health care providers from conditioning treatment upon
the patient's execution of a durable power of attorney.5 7 Ninth, a dura-
ble power of attorney for health care should include a provision for auto-
matic re-execution.58 Finally, the drafters should address the importance
of extending advance directives beyond death to enable the health care
proxy to enforce a patient's medical directives.59
51. P. Jaye Rippley & Carol Warnick, Comment, Live and Let Die: The Status of the "Right to
Die" in Wyoming, 26 LAND & WATER L. REv. 279, 300 (1991); Kronmiller, supra note 50, at 1215.
52. Alexander, supra note 14, at 771.
53. To prevent conflicts of interest, the statute should preclude both health care providers and
witnesses from acting as health care surrogates. Waters, supra note 19, at 542-43.
54. These powers should include access to medical, employment and financial records of the
incapacitated patient. Id. at 543. Such access ensures that proxies will be able to make informed
decisions regarding care and related matters, such as insurance and benefits. Id.
55. One commentator has suggested that this list should include: commitment to a mental
health care facility, convulsive therapy, sterilization, abortion and lobotomy, or any surgery altering
the structure or function of the brain. Id. at 544. Waters also included decisions about withholding
life support in this category. Id. If a patient articulates her opinion about withholding life support
in a clear and convincing manner in the power of attorney document, the statute should authorize
attorneys in fact to make such decisions.
56. One commentator has asserted that statutes should not subject health care surrogates to
criminal or civil liablity for reasonably prudent health care decisions made under a legal durable
power of attorney document. Waters, supra note 19, at 544. The legislature should determine and
articulate the liability standard in the state durable power of attorney law. Id.
Similarly, the durable power of attorney law should include provisions for judicial review. Id.
First, courts should have authority to review both the the acts and fitness of attorneys in fact. Id.
Courts should defer to a patient's selection of an attorney in fact and should not remove her in the
absence of a clear violation of the patient's best interests, as outlined in the patient's power of attor-
ney document. Second, courts should ensure that health care providers comply with the directions
of health care surrogates by cooperating in transfers or by following the directions of surrogates
themselves. Id. at 544-45.
57. Waters, supra note 19, at 544.
58. The statute should require periodic re-execution. Alternatively, the drafters could require
that the patient be in a terminal condition at the time of execution. Alexander, supra note 14, at
772-73.
59. Alexander, supra note 14, at 776. For example, many people have specific opinions about
funeral arrangements. The statute should empower a health care surrogate to ensure that these
wishes are followed. Waters, supra note 19, at 543.
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C. The Inadequacies of Senate Bill 148
Senate bill 148 addresses some, but not all, of the above concerns.' °
Under Senate bill 148, a Missouri citizen may appoint an attorney in fact
for health care decisions by executing a durable power of attorney for
health care document.6" The patient must sign and notarize the docu-
ment.62 The durable power of attorney becomes operative only after at
least two licensed physicians have certified the patient's incapacity.63
Additionally, the durable power of attorney for health care document
must specifically refer to hydration and nutrition if the patient intends
the attorney in fact to have authority to withhold or withdraw either. 4
Although Senate bill 148 grants the right to appoint health care prox-
ies, it limits this right by regulating the persons who may be appointed as
60. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
61. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 404.800-.865 (Supp. 1991).
62. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.705(1X3) (Supp. 1991). This requirement is included in the bill to
ensure that the signatures are authentic. Eliminating notarization or attestation requirements would
enable care providers or family members to execute directives affecting the patient after the patient
became incapacitated and without the patient's approval.
63. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.825 (Supp. 1991). Additionally, before withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration, two physicians must certify that the patient is consistently in a condition making her
unable to understand any consequences of withdrawal. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.820(4) (Supp. 1991).
Because a conscious patient, with the capacity to understand the implications of treatment deci-
sions, can exercise the right to decide without a third party, incapacitation serves as the trigger for
durable powers of attorney. When a patient is incapacitated, her right to decide is jeopardized,
triggering the need for a third party decision-maker to act on her behalf. Likewise, the limitations
on withdrawal of nutrition and hydration ensure that the patient is unable to make the decision
herself, necessitating third party intervention.
One commentator has argued quite forcefully that incapacitation, as defined in the Missouri stat-
ute, is not the proper standard for decision-making. See Kevin P. Quinn, The Best Interests of
Incompetent Patients" The Capacity for Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard for Decisionmak-
ing, 76 CAL. L. REv. 897 (1988). Quinn asserted that standards involving incompetency are unsatis-
factory because they fail to include important quality of life considerations. Id. at 901. He further
commented that the incapacity for interpersonal relationships should trigger surrogate decision-
making. Id. Missouri should consider Quinn's standard for incapacity as an alternative to the
definition in the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.805(2)
(Supp. 1991).
64. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.820 (Supp. 1991). By requiring a patient to include an express
provision for withdrawal, the legislature ensured that clear and convincing evidence of a patient's
intent to withdraw exists before such action is implemented.
Before withdrawing nutrition and hydration, in order to give the patient an opportunity to reject
withdrawal, a health care provider must attempt to explain any consequences to the patient regard-
less of the patient's condition. Id. Consequently, despite the appointment of an attorney in fact, a
patient has one last opportunity to demonstrate decision-making capacity and oppose the with-
drawal. This protection is undoubtedly an outgrowth of the paternalistic Cruzan standard requiring
clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withdraw nutrition and hydration. See supra note 2
and accompanying text.
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attorneys in fact under the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
provisions. Under Senate bill 148, an attending physician or an employee
of a health care facility may not be appointed as an attorney in fact un-
less she is related to or is a member of the same religious order as the
patient.65 Thus, Senate bill 148 avoids any potential conflicts of interest
which may arise from a physician participating in the decision-making
process as both healer and promoter of patient autonomy.
The Senate bill also places restrictions on the actions of parties who
are appointed as attorneys in fact. For example, an attorney in fact must
consider measures to make the patient comfortable.66 She must also seek
and consider information concerning the patient's medical care, progno-
sis, and the advantages and disadvantages of treatment.67 The attorney
in fact may not delegate her decision-making power unless the patient
expressly provided for such delegation in the power of attorney docu-
ment.68 This ensures that the wishes of the incapacitated patient are fol-
lowed rather than those of the appointed proxy or some third party. In
addition to granting the right of appointment and regulating the actions
of appointees, Senate bill 148 requires health care providers to provide
the attorney in fact access to information and medical records. 69 Thus,
the attorney in fact has the same opportunity as the patient to make a
fully informed medical care decision.
Furthermore, Senate bill 148 defines the right of a patient to appoint a
health care proxy in a manner consistent with Missouri's living will and
guardianship provisions.70 The bill authorizes proxy decision-making in
routine situations as well as in life-threatening ones.71 Finally, the health
care decision-making power of proxies extends beyond death to enable
the execution of pre-death directives. 2
Although the authorization of attorneys in fact represents a significant
65. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.815 (Supp. 1991).
66. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.820(3) (Supp. 1991).
67. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.822 (Supp. 1991).
68. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.865 (Supp. 1991).
69. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.840(2) (Supp. 1991).
70. Senate Bill 148 restates that a patient must specifically refer to withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration if she intends for the surrogate to have authority to pursue such actions. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 404.820(1) (Supp. 1991).
71. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.822 (Supp. 1991). Because the Act does not specifically refer to the
decisions which surrogates are authorized to make, surrogates seemingly have the right to make
routine decisions for incapacitated patients. Id.
72. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.710(6) (Supp. 1991). Powers to make post-mortem decisions depend
upon express enumeration in the power of attorney document. Id.
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step toward protecting the rights of individuals to allow health care prov-
iders to execute advance directives, Senate bill 148 offers incomplete pro-
tection and regulation. The Missouri legislature should amend the bill to
include an explanation of the extent to which patients and family mem-
bers may hold health care surrogates liable. First, although agency law
binds agents to act in the principal's best interest, statutory provisions
outlining the penalties for violating the patient's directives are important
protective devices.7" Second, the drafters should amend the bill to in-
clude educational mandates. Unless the average patient is aware of the
durable power of attorney for health care, the protections the attorney in
fact offers are inaccessible to her. Third, provisions authorizing family
consent enable a citizen, who has not had notice of the right to execute
an advance directive, to have family members who are most familiar with
her beliefs about death-prolonging care, make medical decisions on her
behalf. Absent these provisions, Senate bill 148 cannot adequately pro-
tect the rights of individuals to make health care decisions.
IV. THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
A health care provider is the only party empowered to carry out medi-
cal care decisions.74 Consequently, the health care provider plays a vital
role in protecting the patient's right to make medical decisions. A health
care durable power of attorney statute would be incomplete if it did not
address the rights and duties of health care providers.
A. Rights
A health care provider should have the right to refuse to withdraw or
73. While the statutory language is mandatory, the law does not impose civil penalties for
noncompliance.
A copy of a power of attorney for health care decisions shall be made a part of the patient's
medical record when the existence of the power of attorney becomes known to the patient's
health care provider and prior to the provider's [sic] taking any action pursuant to the
decision of the attorney in fact.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.840(l) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
Without penalties, no state enforcement of these reporting duties exists. States must follow the
federal government's initiative and include enforcement provisions in durable power of attorney
statutes. At the federal level, failure to comply with the reporting provisions of the Self Determina-
tion Act results in a loss of any rights a health care provider may have as a Medicaid contracting
institution. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w) (Supp. 1991).
74. The health care provider is just that - the party who physically provides care. Without
the health care provider, a patient would have no access to medicine and treatment. Consequently,
the health care provider plays a vital role in protecting the patient's right to control when and what
care is provided.
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withhold medical treatment based on moral or religious beliefs.71 A
health care provider should also be authorized to follow the instructions
of an attorney in fact without incurring liability to the patient or the
patient's family. 6 In addition, a durable power of attorney for health
care should include a provision addressing whether a health care pro-
vider is liable for damages arising out of failure to fulfill duties prescribed
under the statute.7
B. Duties
The statute should enumerate the duties under a durable power of at-
torney for health care. The law should include: (1) the duty to educate
patients and employees about health care advance directives; (2) the duty
to cooperate with health care proxies; and (3) the duty to include ad-
vance directives in medical records. By informing patients and medical
personnel about state laws on advance directives, health care providers
may assist in eliminating any confusion arising from ignorance of the
law.78 By cooperating with health care proxies, health care providers
may further protect a patient's right to decide. Finally, by including all
advance directives in a patient's record, health care providers may pro-
tect the patient's interests, as well as insulate themselves from potential
liability.79
75. Because of the controversial nature of discontinuing medical treatment and the apparent
conflict between discontinuation of care and the Hippocratic Oath, health care providers should
have the option to refuse to withdraw treatment. However, physicians should also be under a duty
to transfer patients to a facility which will comply with the patient's wishes. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 404.830 (Supp. 1991) (allowing such a religious exemption).
76. Waters, supra note 19, at 544. Protection against liability to the patient and the patient's
family is one plausible means of ensuring that physicians follow the attorney in fact's instructions.
77. David E. Fowler, Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care Decisions, TENN. BAR J.,
Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 20, 23.
78. If medical patients and personnel are not cognizant of the purpose, availability, require-
ments, and scope of durable powers of attorney, undoubtedly some confusion will result.
79. Placing advance directives in the patient's record serves two purposes: (I) it protects the
patients by making the document permanently available to the medical personnel responsible for the
patient's health care, and (2) it protects health care providers by serving as authority for reliance on
instructions from an attorney in fact. Once a health care provider learns that a patient revoked a
power of attorney for health care, she should include the revocation as part of the patient's medical
record. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.850(2) (Supp. 1991). Thus, future physicians will not inadvertently
follow the instructions of a party who no longer has decision-making authority.
Senate bill 148 does not require a health care provider to ask about advance directives. See Mo.
REv. STAT. § 404.840(1) (Supp. 1991). The duty to make directives a part of a patient's record
begins only after the durable power of attorney for health care "becomes known" to the provider.
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C. The Inadequacies of Senate Bill 148
Senate bill 148 addresses some of these rights and duties in depth. It
allows health care providers to transfer a patient if the health care pro-
vider morally or religiously objects to the instructions given by a health
care proxy.80 Senate bill 148 requires health care providers to include
any durable power of attorney document in a patient's medical record.8"
Further, Senate bill 148 requires health care providers to give attorneys
in fact access to information, medical records, and diagnosis.8 2
One of the most important sections in Senate bill 148 establishes the
potential liability of third parties.83 Specifically, as long as the third
party acts in good faith, she may rely on and proceed to act according to
the instructions of the attorney in fact without incurring any liability to
the patient or her successors in interest.84 In addition, the bill provides
that it is unlawful for any health care provider or health insurance com-
pany to require a patient to execute a health care durable power of attor-
ney document as a condition for the provision of health care.85
While these potential liability sections provide important assurances of
health care provider compliance, they are incomplete. Senate bill 148
demands that physicians and other health care providers cooperate with
proxy decision-makers in transferring patients, but the bill imposes no
duty on providers to honor the instructions of the attorney in fact if such
instructions are contrary to the physician's religious or moral beliefs.86
Consequently, if a transfer is not executed, a patient's wishes may be
Id. Without a duty to inquire, the reporting provisions do not provide necessary protection for
patients or health care providers.
80. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.830 (Supp. 1991).
81. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.840 (Supp. 1991).
82. Id.
83. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.855 (Supp. 1991).
84. Id.
85. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.835 (Supp. 1991).
86. Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.830(1) (Supp. 1991). The bill simply requires that a health care
provider cooperate with any effort to transfer a patient to a facility which will follow the attorney in
fact's instructions. Thus, if a transfer is not executed, health care providers who harbor different
opinions of death-prolonging care may disregard a patient's right to make health care decisions.
Consequently, the patient should seek medical care at a facility which will honor the attorney in
fact's treatment and withdrawal decisions. Missouri should enact a provision similiar to the federal
Self Determination Act which requires health care facilities to provide written information to pa-
tients about policies regarding the implementation of the right to refuse treatment, thus enabling
patients to determine whether a facility will follow advance directives. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w)(1)(A)
(Supp. 1991).
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ignored.8 7 Furthermore, the liability provisions do not address the pen-
alty for noncompliance with reporting requirements. The legislature
should determine appropriate sanctions for failure to include advance di-
rectives in a patient's medical record. In addition, the Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care Act should incorporate sanctions if a health
care provider fails to make a mandatory inquiry into whether a patient
executed advance directives.
By reorganizing and clarifying the sanctions for any failures to fulfill
duties under the Act, the legislature may provide more accurate and fair
notice to health care providers concerning potential sanctions and avoid
unnecessary litigation over noncompliance.8 8 Without sanctions, durable
power of attorney documents will not protect the patient's right to make
medical treatment choices.
V. CONCLUSION
While Missouri Senate bill 148 is an important step in protecting an
individual's right to make prospective health care decisions, the bill falls
far short of providing complete protection. For example, the bill in-
cludes no provisions for educating patients, physicians, and the commu-
nity about the purpose and availability of advance directives. The
drafters also failed to provide guidelines for substituted consent by family
members. Although the bill contains penalties for falsification and de-
struction of durable powers of attorney for health care, appointed proxies
and health care providers are not liable for failing to implement the
wishes of the patient or for failing to record durable powers of attorney
in the patient's record.
Missouri has recognized the right to execute advance directives. Now,
Missouri must reorganize and expand the statute to reflect the legisla-
ture's intent to protect an individual's right to make prospective medical
care decisions. The legislature should amend the statute to assure Mis-
sourians that attorneys in fact, doctors, and the courts will have both the
authority and the incentive to act on the patient's behalf and at the pa-
tient's direction.
Catherine M. Sheafor
87. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
88. Penalties could include: withholding compensation for medical services provided to patients
with improperly recorded advance directives; civil fines; disciplinary action for unprofessional con-
duct; and revocation of a provider's license. Condie, supra note 15, at 119-20.
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